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Abstract
Cryptocurrencies and their foundation technology, the Blockchain, are reshaping finance and economics, allowing a
decentralized approach enabling trusted applications with no trusted counterpart. More recently, the Blockchain and
the programs running on it, called Smart Contracts, are also finding more and more applications in all fields requiring
trust and sound certifications. Some people have come to the point of saying that the “Blockchain revolution” can
be compared to that of the Internet and the Web in their early days. As a result, all software development revolving
around the Blockchain technology is growing at a staggering rate. The feeling of many software engineers about such
huge interest in Blockchain technologies is that of unruled and hurried software development, a sort of competition on
a first-come-first-served basis which does not assure neither software quality, nor that the basic concepts of software
engineering are taken into account. This paper tries to cope with this issue, proposing a software development process
to gather the requirement, analyze, design, develop, test and deploy Blockchain applications. The process is based
on several Agile practices, such as User Stories and iterative and incremental development based on them. However,
it makes also use of more formal notations, such as some UML diagrams describing the design of the system, with
additions to represent specific concepts found in Blockchain development. The method is described in good detail,
and an example is given to show how it works.
Keywords: Blockchain, Smart Contracts, Blockchain-oriented software engineering, UML, dApp design
1. Introduction
The so-called "decentralized applications", or "dApps", are one of the main new trends of software development.
dApps typically run on a blockchain, the technology originally introduced to manage the Bitcoin digital currency
[1]. Blockchain software runs in a network of peer-to-peer nodes, so it is naturally decentralized, redundant and
transparent. A few years after the introduction of Bitcoin in 2009, developers and managers realized that a blockchain
can be also the ideal environment for a decentralized computer. This led to the introduction of Ethereum blockchain,
a network whose nodes are also able to run Turing-complete programs [2], called "Smart Contracts" (SCs) following
and idea of Nick Szabo [3]. SCs are general computer programs, though with some specific features. The main
idea behind them is that they can be used for the automated enforcement of contractual obligations, without having
to trust a central authority, and without space and time constraints. So, there is a huge wave of interest in SCs and
applications of the blockchain, especially in the financial realm. Some authors even said that "we should think about
the Blockchain as another class of thing like the Internet [...]" [4] and that the "wide adoption of Blockchain technology
has the potential of reshaping the current financial services technical infrastructure." [5].
This interest led to a huge amount of money flooding into Blockchain ventures. During 2017, this steady inflow
of money, paired with the limited amount of available digital money – a feature that most digital currencies have by
design – made the price of Bitcoin and other digital currencies spike at the end of the year. This peak was mainly
ignited by the Initial Coin Offers (ICO) phenomenon, where a startup publishes a white paper describing their idea,
and gathers digital money by issuing a token, which is a second level digital currency, managed by a SC [6]. This
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token can then be immediately traded on an exchange (a pseudo bank running on the Web, which allows to exchange
digital currencies against traditional money, or against other digital currencies). The enthusiasm for this new idea, the
ever increasing prices and profits, and the fear of missing out (FOMO) led to many billions USD pouring into tokens.
At the beginning of 2018 the bubble deflated, with the global capitalization of digital currencies going from more than
800 billion USD on January 7, 2018, to about 115 billion USD on February 2019. During 2019, however, a renewed
interest to digital currencies lead their global market cap back to about 200 billion USD as of September. Huge inflows
of money and venture capital were also poured into blockchain initiatives not linked to digital currencies. These are
the so called "permissioned" blockchains, or distributed ledgers (DL), intended to be run by a set of nodes chosen by
invitation.
All the initiatives behind blockchain technology – new digital currencies with their own blockchain, exchanges
and other Web-based ventures using digital money, ICO startups, applications running on permissioned blockchains or
DLs – are based on developing a new software system. This often led to a run to be the first on the market, as always
happens with new technology waves, with quick application development, neglecting good development practices,
and often even basic testing and security assessment.
Some big disasters quickly followed, with a total of literally billions of USD (at least at the nominal exchange rate)
of digital currencies stolen or lost. Several exchanges were hacked, since the beginning of Bitcoin trading, for a total
of various billion equivalent USD (for a list up to 2017, see [7]). Also, SCs were often exploited, taking advantage of
their novelty and of the hurried software development [8], [9].
Overall, the scenario looks that of a competition on a first-come-first-served basis, where the basic principles and
practices of software engineering (SE) are not taken into account. The quality of the resulting software is accordingly
compromised.
It is well known that, to develop a reliable and maintainable software system, one needs to follow an explicit
development process, and use sound SE practices. Among the latters, in the context of blockchain development, we
stress the importance of requirement elicitation, system design, specific notations and security assessment. In essence,
we need blockchain-oriented software engineering (BOSE) [10].
In this paper we present a development process for applications based on Smart Contracts running on a blockchain,
which are usually called "dApps" (decentralized applications). The process covers all the standard phases of software
life cycle: requirement elicitation, design, implementation, security assessment and testing, and ongoing maintenance.
We call the process "ABCDE", Agile Block Chain Dapp Engineering. ABCDE is an agile software development
process, meaning that is follows the principles of Agile Manifesto [11]. However, we had to complement the agile
process with a more formal approach, using UML diagrams with a specific notation for SCs, and a specific checklist
for security assessment.
The first question we had to answer regarding ABCDE is "why a new process"? Why not use an existing process,
waterfall or agile, for dApp development? The answer to this question stems from the observation that a SC is very
peculiar software. It runs on all the nodes hosting a Blockchain, and its execution has the strong constraint that all
outputs and state changes resulting from SC execution must be the same in all nodes. Consequently, a SC is strictly
forbidden to access the external word – it can answer to external messages belonging to its public interface, and can
send messages to other SCs running on the same blockchain; no other kind of interaction with the external world is
allowed. This fact implies that any dApp is intrinsically divided in two subsystems – the SCs running on a blockchain,
and the applications allowing users and devices to interact with the SCs. Another specificity of SC realm is the need
to introduce new concepts with respect to traditional programming, like those of "address" to refer to SCs; of signed
"transaction" to send a message starting from a given address; of "GAS" needed to run a SC; of digital money owned
by, and transferred between, SCs; of "oracle", a SC able to provide data coming from the external world without
violating the constraint described above. Moreover, referring to Solidity, the programming language of Ethereum,
which is presently the most used blockchain actually running SCs, there are further specific concepts, such as those of
"modifier" (a boolean function acting as a guard to the execution of another function), of "library contract", and there
are constraints on the use of typical structures of object oriented programming languages. For instance, inheritance
is limited, and the available collections are just arrays and mappings. Finally, two papers by Chakraborty, Bosu et
al. [12] [13], present the results of a survey among blockchain developers. They found that the prevalent opinion
is that blockchain development is different from traditional one, due to the strict and non-conventional security and
reliability requirements, and to other unique characteristics of the dApp development domain, such as immutability,
difficulty in upgrading the software, and so on. More information on this survey is presented in Sec. 3.
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This specificity led us to conclude that a new method is needed for dApp development. In fact, ABCDE is not
entirely new, but it is a significant extension to classical agile methods, such as Scrum [14]. With respect to Scrum,
ABCDE does not only describe how the development should be managed, but also introduces specific practices such
as the use of modified UML diagrams to describe SCs, and checklists for security assessment. Other agile practices,
such as simplicity, test driven development [15], refactoring [16], collective code ownership, pair programming, are
encouraged if the team feels they are useful, but are not prescribed by ABCDE.
The main characteristic of ABCDE is the split of dApp development in two flows which are carried on concur-
rently, after a common start. The first flow is the specification and development of the SCs. The second flow is about
the development of the software applications which allow external actors to interact with the SCs.
In this paper, we also introduce a notation augmenting some UML diagrams (Use Case, Sequence, and Class
diagrams) to account for SC specificity in the context of Solidity language. The dApp design when other languages to
develop SCs are used can be represented with different UML extensions. In this paper, we limit ourselves to Solidity.
The proposed ABCDE methods has been tested on some real dApp development projects, carried on at our de-
partment, and at some firms we are consultant of.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we describe the architecture of a dApp, and
introduce the specific issues and practices needed for dApp development. In Section 3 we present the related work
in the same, or similar fields. Section 4 describes the proposed ABCDE process in every detail, including the mod-
ifications of some UML diagrams to cope with Solidity concepts, security assessment and what is needed to extend
the notation to other languages for SC development. A simplified example, drawn from a real case, is presented in
Section 5, together with reporting on actual uses of ABCDE. Finally, Section 6 presents the conclusions and future
work ideas.
2. Background
2.1. Decentralized applications
We define as dApp (decentralized application) a software system that uses distributed ledger technology (DLT),
typically a blockchain1, as a central hub to store and exchange information, through Smart Contracts (SCs). Note that
it is not a blockchain software able to manage a new cryptocurrency or other applications – that is, software enabling
blockchain nodes, which needs different kinds of of development practices, not the subject of this work.
A blockchain is a distributed data structure – managed by a set of connected nodes – characterized by the following
elements:
• it is redundant (each node holds a copy of the blockchain);
• it is append-only – once written, the information cannot be changed or deleted;
• the blockchain state is changed by sending transactions to the network – in public blockchains, everyone can
send a transaction;
• all transactions are checked by the reached nodes; invalid ones are ignored;
• the valid transactions are typically recorded in sequentially ordered blocks – hence the name "blockchain" –
whose creation is managed by a consensus algorithm among the nodes;
• all transactions are sent from an unique address, which is in turn computed from a public key. Only the owner
of the private key associated with it can sign the transactions coming from this address using asymmetric
cryptography, validating them;
• if the blockchain is able to execute SCs, a transaction can create a SC, or execute one of its public functions; in
this case, the function is executed by all nodes, when the transaction is evaluated – the execution of the program
is the execution of the transaction.
1From now on, we’ll use the terms "DLT" and "blockchain" interchangeably.
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A dApp is usually composed of SCs deployed on a blockchain, and of software able to create and send transac-
tions to them. This software usually provides a user interface, running on a PC, or on a mobile device. Additional
information could be stored on a server, and further business logic could be executed on this.
Most present real applications of dApps and SCs are intended for the management of digital currencies or tokens,
that have a true monetary value. The use of dApps has been introduced also for other scopes, like notarization of
information, identity management, voting, games and betting, goods provenance certification, and many others [17].
Figure 1: The Ethereum Blockchain running a SC. The same SC bytecode is executed by each node.
In this paper, we will use as a reference Ethereum, whose SCs were the first to exhibit a Turing-complete capability,
and is presently the most used blockchain to develop SCs [18]. Just to quote some figures, as of October 1, 2019 there
were 1533 out of 1720 active tokens2 managed by Ethereum SCs, worth more than 8 billion USD at current prices
[19]. Moreover, as of November 2019, 2654 dApps were running on Ethereum, out of a total of 3169 surveyed dApps
[20]. These figures are about public blockchains. Data on dApps running on permissioned blockchains are more
difficult to find, but Ethereum is very popular also for this kind of dApps. Open source DLTs such as Hyperledger and
Corda are also widely used.
The Ethereum Virtual Machine (EVM), able to execute SC Ethereum bytecode, runs on all nodes of the Ethereum
blockchain [21]. In practice, the SCs are written in high-level languages (HLL). Nowadays, the most popular HLL
for Ethereum is called Solidity. Other languages, such as Flint and Vyper can be used, but their adoption is still far
behind Solidity. Fig. 1 shows a sketch of the Ethereum blockchain, with the architecture of its nodes running a SC.
The original Ethereum software running the node is written in C++ or Go language. A compatible implementation
written in Rust language (Parity) is also available.
2We define as "active" a token whose market cap is over 100,000 USD.
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As written in the Introduction, SCs run in an isolated environment. The results of their execution must be the
same whatever node they run in; consequently, they cannot get information from the external world (which mutates
with time), and cannot initiate a computation autonomously (for instance at given times). SCs can only access and
change their state, and send messages to other SCs. The state of a SC is permanently stored in the blockchain, using
storage variables. Another SC specificity is their immutability. Once a SC is deployed, it is in the blockchain forever
– it cannot be modified or erased, though it can be forever disabled.
SCs are created by special transactions. Creating a SC and changing its state costs units of "GAS", which must
be paid in Ether (the digital currency of the Ethereum Blockchain). Each SC has a unique Ethereum address, that is
used to send messages to it. In Solidity, a SC can inherit from other SCs; it has a public interface, that is a set of
functions that can be called through a transaction. The call of a public function of a SC is called a "message". Sending
a message to a SC can be performed either by posting a transaction coming from an address, or by executing code of
the same, or of another SC. In the former case, the transaction must be accepted by the network, and it will take time,
and a bigger amount of GAS. In the latter case, the execution is immediate, and the cost is lower.
A SC can receive and send Ethers, from and to another SC, or an address. A function belonging to a SC can
change its state, can call functions belonging to other SCs, including itself, and can create and send a transaction to an
address or to another SC. In the latter case, the transaction is executed immediately. A function which returns a value
without changing the state of its SC or sending a transaction, is executed immediately by the EVM and costs nothing.
This kind of function is said of type "view".
Figure 2: A typical architecture of an Ethereum dApp application. The App System is shown on the right, the blockchain with its SCs on the left.
A typical dApp architecture is shown in Fig. 2. It is composed of a software system running on mobile devices
and/or on servers, possibly on the Cloud, exchanging information with users and external devices, which we call "App
System". Its User Interface (UI) typically runs on a Web browser. It can have a server component, to store data that
cannot be stored in the blockchain, and to perform business computations. In Ethereum, the App System typically
communicates with the blockchain using the "web3.js" Javascript library, which manages the creation and dispatch of
transactions.
The other component are the SCs running on the blockchain. In a not trivial system, it is composed of various SCs
deployed on the blockhain and identified by their Ethereum address.
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2.2. Agility and dApp Development
Nowadays, the developments of dApps worldwide share some common characteristics. Several teams involved are
typically working on ICO projects, which gathered money through tokens and are about applications of blockchain
technology. Other projects are promoted by startups trying to take advantage of the novelty of dApps to develop
disruptive solutions, or to get a niche where to thrive. In both cases, they are typically small, self-organizing co-
located teams, where experts of system requirements are highly available.
Other characteristics of dApp development is that dApps typically are not life-critical applications, though some
of them can be mission-critical. However, the time-to-market and the ability to get an early feedback from the users
and the stakeholders are essential, though often the requirements of the dApp initially are only vaguely defined and
are subject to change.
All these features make dApp development an ideal candidate for tha use of Agile Methods (AMs). In fact, AMs
are suited for small, self-organizing teams, possibly co-located, working on projects whose requirements can change
[11]. AMs are considered to be able to deliver quickly and often, as needed by dApp projects.
The most used AM is presently Scrum, which is iterative and incremental, with short iterations (1-4 weeks) [14].
Scrum does not prescribe specific software development practices, but is focused on the process. In short, Scrum, as
most other AMs, typically performs requirement elicitation through User Stories (USs), that are short descriptions of
how the system answers to inputs from users, or from external devices [22]. USs are mostly gathered at the beginning
of the development, but can be modified and augmented at any time. The project advances iteratively implementing a
subset of the USs at each iteration. The person in charge of choosing this subset, and explaining their USs to the team
is the Product Owner.
Other agile practices that are well suited to dApp development, and that can be used in the proposed process if the
team chooses them are:
• Test Driven Design: this practice prescribes writing the tests before the code [23], using an automated test suite
that can be run whenever needed. For the App System, this is the preferred technique, because it guarantees
that the Unit Tests are always present, and their development is not indefinitely postponed if the team is under
pressure. For SCs written in Solidity, at the moment the most popular testing environment is Truffle [24].
• Continuous Integration: the practice of merging all developer working copies to a shared mainline, even several
times a day. Developing dApps, this practice is critical, and it should be practiced both on the App System
and the SCs, checking at each merging also how the two systems interact through transactions. This practice
requires a development environment provided of a working test blockchain, possibly simulated, to deploy SCs
and to test all interactions.
• Collective code ownership: this practice allows every developer to intervene on whatever code s/he considers
appropriate to modify. With small, dynamic teams as typically happens with dApp development, this practice
should clearly be applied. However, often the team members expert in SC development differ from those expert
in App System, so their spheres of influence remain separate.
• Refactoring: this is the attitude to intervene on the code whenever and wherever it can be improved, improving
its design without introducing new features. This practice needs to have an automated test suite, that can be run
when the refactoring is made, to assess the absence of unwanted side effects. This is especially needed with the
complex architecture of dApps, whose components interacts through transactions.
• Information Radiators (Cards, Boards, Burndown charts): making visible the status of a project using boards
that can be observed by everyone and updated in real time, is an practice that is common to all agile projects,
and that can obviously greatly benefit also dApp development.
• Coding Standards: the practice of strictly following the same coding standard throughout the code, with proper
differentiation between App System code and SCs, should be applied to all projects developed following sound
SE practices. However, the dynamicity of the teams and the push to quickly develop applications make neces-
sary that the project manager (or the Scrum Master) ensures that this practice is strictly followed.
6
• Pair Programming (PP): this practice is strictly enforced in "pure" Extreme Programming teams [25]. In our
approach, we suggest to use PP in the case the software to be developed is critical, is not yet well understood,
or there are new team members to train on the job.
2.3. Security Assessment
In the previous section, we made the case for using agile practices for developing dApps. However, many dApps
deal with direct digital currency or token usage, that is with entities that have a direct, real monetary value. In other
cases, they may deal with contractual issues, again with strong economic implications, as in the case of document
certification, supply chain management, voting systems. Therefore, in most cases dApps are business-critical, and
very strict security requirements should be assured. Code inspection, security patterns, and thorough tests must be
applied to get a reasonable security level. ABCDE proposed security assessment will be described in detail in Section
4.3.
3. Related Work
SE for dApp development, sometime called Blockchain-Oriented Software Engineering (BOSE) is still in its in-
fancy. The first call for BOSE was made in 2017 by Porru et al. They highligh "the need for new professional
roles, enhanced security and reliability, novel modeling languages, and specialized metrics", and propose "new direc-
tions for blockchain-oriented software engineering, focusing on collaboration among large teams, testing activities,
and specialized tools for the creation of smart contracts" [10]. They also suggest the adaptation of existing design
notations, such as UML, the Unified Modelling Language [26] to unambiguously specify and document dApps.
The book by Xu et al. is perhaps the most complete overview of the engineering aspects of blockchains to date
[27]. Among others, it deals with some SE issues, such as the evaluation of the suitability to use a dApp or not, the
selection and configuration of the proper blockchain solution (public, permissioned, private), a collection of patterns
for the design of blockchain-based applications, and even model-driven generation of SC code. Some of the topics of
the book were introduced previously in [28].
Wessling et al. propose a method to find how the architecture of an application could benefit from blockchain
technology. They identify the actors involved and how they trust each others to derive a high-level hybrid architecture
of a blockchain-based application [29].
Fridgen et al. propose an approach for eliciting use cases in the context of blockchain applications, applying
action design research method. Their method is evaluated in four distinct case studies regarding banking, insurance,
automotive and construction [30].
Jurgelaitis et al. propose a method based on Model Driven Architecture, which could be used for describing
blockchain-based systems using a general language in order to facilitate blockchain development process [31].
A paper by Beller and Hejderup [32] is worth mentioning, though it does not really advocate to use SE practices
to develop blockchain applications. Instead, it is about "how blockchain technology could solve two core SE prob-
lems: Continuous Integration (CI) Services such as Travis CI and Package Managers such as apt-get". The use of
SCs to manage agile development, including the automated compensation of developers when their software passes
acceptance tests was also proposed by Lenarduzzi et al. [33], [34].
Chakraborty et al. using an online survey got answers from 156 active blockchain software (BCS) developers,
finding that "standard software engineering methods including testing and security best practices need to be adapted
with more seriousness to address unique characteristics of blockchain and mitigate potential threats" [12]. The same
authors published an extended version of the same research, further highlighting that there is a need for "an array of
new or improved tools, such as: customized IDE for BCS development tasks, debuggers for smart-contracts, testing
support, easily deployable simulators, and BCS domain specific design notations" [13]. They found that most BCS
developers feel that BCS development is different from traditional one, due to the strict and non-conventional security
and reliability requirements, and to other unique characteristics of the dApp development domain (e.g., immutability,
difficulty in upgrading the software, operations on a complex, secured, distributed and decentralized network). As
anticipated in the Introduction, these findings confirm the expedience to devise a software engineering process such
as ABCDE for BCS development.
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Regarding dApp security, many publicly available documents, and scientific papers have been already published.
Among the most recent ones, the survey of Praitheeshan et al. analyzes the literature about Ethereum SC secu-
rity, summarizing the main security attacks against SCs, their key vulnerabilities, the security analysis methods and
tools [35]. They classify analysis methods in static analysis, dynamic analysis, and formal verification, and discuss
the relative pros and cons of these classes, also providing a large bibliography with 160 references. Huang et al. deal
with SC security in a broader way, considering also Hyperledger security, and performing a survey from a software
lifecycle perspective [36]. After a classification of security issues in SCs, both in Ethereum and Hyperledger Fabric,
they consider the securities activities according to the various phases of dApp development (design, implementation,
testing before deployment, and runtime monitoring), quoting several references and giving practical advice. These
two papers together include references to virtually all the work which have been published about SC security to date.
Various papers have been published to suggest upgrades of Unified Modeling Language [26] notation to enable
it to better represent specific application fields. Baumeister et al. described an extension of UML for Hypermedia
design, through the addition of a new Navigational Structure Model and new stereotypes [37].
Baresi et al. extend and customize UML with web design concepts borrowed from the Hypermedia Design Model.
Hypermedia elements are described through appropriate UML stereotypes [38].
Rocha and Ducasse [39] study SC design and compare three complementary software engineering models – Entity-
Relationship diagrams, UML and BPMN. To better represent SC concepts, they propose a simple addition to UML
Class Diagrams, that is a small "chain" icon in the UML class representing a contract as a notation to more easily
identify it as a blockchain artifact.
4. Proposed Method for dApp Development
4.1. Overall Process
Our approach, ABCDE, takes into account the substantial difference between developing traditional software (the
App System) and developing SCs, and separates the two activities. For both developments, ABCDE takes advantage
of on an agile approach, because agile methods are suited to develop systems whose requirements are not completely
understood since the beginning, or tend to change, as it is the case of dApps. However, a more formal approach with
respect to agile development is also added, to address the security and maintenance issues which are very important
in dApp development.
The steps of the proposed ABCDE design method, which is currently focused on Ethereum blockchain and Solidity
language, are shown in Fig. 3 as UML activity diagram. Note that most steps are in fact performed many times,
because the approach is iterative and incremental.
In deeper detail, the proposed development process is the following:
1. Goal of the system. Write 10-30 words summing up the goal, and display them in a place that is visible to
the whole team. This is a practice that, as far as we know, was introduced by Coad and Yourdon in their 1991
book on object-oriented analysis [40], and that we always found useful. It has some similarities with the "Sprint
Goal" that Scrum method prescribes to find and make visible to the team, at the beginning of each iteration [14],
but here the goal is found for the whole system.
2. Find the actors. Identify the actors who will interact with the dApp system. The actors are human roles, and
external systems or devices that exchange information with the dApp to build.
3. User Stories. The system requirements are expressed as user stories (USs) [22], to be able to follow the classical
agile approach for project management, used in Extreme Programming [25] and Scrum [14]. In this step, the
dApp system under development should be considered in full. The decision to develop it using a blockchain,
a set of servers, possibly in the cloud, or another architecture, is not important. At this point, we found useful,
though not mandatory, to use a UML Use Case Diagram to graphically show the relationships among the actors
and the USs. If the decision is taken to implement the system using a blockchain, and related SCs, the following
steps are taken.
4. Divide the system in two subsystems.
4.1 The SCs running on the blockchain.
4.2 The App System, that is the external system that interacts with the blockchain, creating and sending
transactions, and monitoring the Events that may happen when a SC executes a function.
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Figure 3: The proposed ABCDE process, shown as a UML activity diagram.
5. Design of the SCs.
This step is about designing the SCs, using in our case the Solidity language. This activity has very peculiar
characteristics with respect to standard software design, as highlighted by [12]. The activity is not performed
in a single step for the whole SC system, but is performed through iterations that include coding and delivering
increments of SCs, which are the USs chosen for each iteration. Its sub-steps are the following:
5.1 Replay steps 2 and 3 (finding Actors and USs) by focusing only on actors directly interacting with the SCs.
If external SCs are used by the SCs of the system under development, they should be included among the
actors. For each US defined in this step, define also the related acceptance test(s).
5.2 Define broadly the SCs composing the SC subsystem, stating their responsibilities to store information,
and the messages they should respond to. For non-trivial systems, you will typically need various interact-
ing SCs. Consider also the use of inheritance for abstracting common features of SCs. Describe in detail
the interfaces of the libraries and of the external SCs used. UML class diagrams with proper additions will
be used, as shown later in Sec. 4.2.
5.3 Define the flow of messages and Ether transfers among SCs, external SCs and the App System. Use
UML sequence diagrams to document these interactions, if they are non-trivial. If needed, define the state
changes of SCs using UML statecharts.
5.4 Define in detail the data structure of the SCs, their external interface (Application Binary Interface, ABI)
and the relevant events that can be raised by the functions of the SC.
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5.5 Define the internal, private functions and the modifiers – special functions that are executed before the
functions that apply them, and that usually test the preconditions needed before the function can be safely
executed.
5.6 Define the tests and perform the security assessment practices. This is a very important step because, as
already explained above, most SCs are very critical and deal with money. Section 4.3 in the followings
describes in deeper detail the security assessment we use for Ethereum SCs.
6. Coding and testing the SC system. Following the agile approach, the SC system is built and tested incremen-
tally. We advocate following a Scrum approach [14], because it is very effective and popular among developers.
In Scrum, a subset of USs are implemented at each iteration. However, also a Lean-Kanban approach is feasi-
ble, implementing the USs in a continuous flow, with the work in progress controlled by the Kanban board [41].
The coding and testing activities are:
6.1 Incrementally write and test the SCs with an agile approach (Scrum or Kanban). Owing to the strict
security requirements, typically this activity cannot be performed in a strict incremental way, just imple-
menting one US after another. Instead, starting from the data structure and interfaces of SCs, the overall
kernel SC architecture is implemented and tested first. This can be accomplished by using special "User
Stories" which are not the description of the interaction with users, but are about the implementation of
the architecture of the system. Then, complementary USs can be added.
6.2 Perform the security assessment of the code written for the increment (see section 5).
6.3 Write automated Unit Tests (UTs) and Acceptance Tests (ATs) for the SCs and USs implemented, respec-
tively. Add the new tests to the test suite. The most used testing environments for Solidity is Truffle [24].
Run the whole test suite to make sure that the additions did not break the system.
7. Design of the external interaction subsystem (App System).
This step is about designing the App System, which interacts with the users and devices, send messages to the
blockchain, and can manage its own repositories (data bases and/or documents). This activity is very similar
to designing a standard Web application. It just adds another actor – the blockchain – which can receive (but
cannot send) messages and queries. Note that also in this case we must be very careful about security aspects.
In fact, often the hacks of dApps systems are made exploiting App System weaknesses, rather that SCs’ ones.
7.1 Redefine the actors and the USs for the App System, starting from those gathered in steps 2 and 3, adding
the new actors represented by the SCs that interact with the App System. Define the acceptance tests of
the App System.
7.2 Design the high-level architecture of the App System, including server and client tiers, and detail the
way it accesses the blockchain. The access can be done setting up and running one or more nodes of the
blockchain, through an external provider, or using a standard wallet.
7.3 Define the UI of the App System, typically with a responsive approach, so that it can run on both mobile
terminals and PCs. Having a fancy UI is of paramount importance to achieve the market success of the
whole system. We suggest to perform UI design using well known standard approaches, such as Usage-
Centered Design [42] and Interaction Design [43].
7.4 Define how the App System is decomposed in modules, their interfaces and the flow of messages between
them. Define, if needed, the state diagrams of the modules, and the actions they take when events are
raised by SCs. Define the structure and memorization of permanent data. Select which data are anchored
to the blockchain, by notarization of their hash digest. Define the structure of the data or classes of the
App System, including the flow of data and control between modules. The interactions with the SCs
must be consistent with the analysis of step 5.3. Since we use and agile approach, this design activity is
not performed up-front, but through iterations that include coding and delivering increments of the App
System, that is implementation of the USs chosen for the iteration. As the App System is created, the
need of additions or updates to the architecture may arise. Due to the above quoted security requirements,
this design phase must be quite detailed, and made consistently with the corresponding activities of SCs
design. UML class and sequence diagrams can help to design and document this system.
7.5 Perform a security assessment of the external system, as described below in Sec. 4.3.
8. Coding and testing the App System. In parallel to the SCs system, the App System is built and tested. Also
in this case, we advocate following a Scrum approach. Alternatively, the team may chose a Lean-Kanban
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approach. Of course, the same approach should be used for both SCs and App System development. We stress
that, if the developments of SCs and App System are made iteratively, every two or three iterations the results
of the two branches must be integrated, as shown in Fig. 3. If a continuous-flow, Lean-Kanban approach
is performed, the integration should happen at the completion of every US, in both branches. The activities
happening in parallel are:
8.1 Incrementally implement the USs of App System with an agile approach (Scrum or Kanban). This step
belongs to the "right flow" of ABCDE (see Fig. 3), and does not differ from the implementation of a Web
application using Scrum or Kanban.
8.2 Perform the security assessment of the code written for the increment.
8.3 Write automated Unit Tests (UTs) and Acceptance Tests (ATs) for the USs implemented. Add the new
tests to the test suite. Run the whole test suite to make sure that the additions did not break the system.
9. Integrate, test and deploy the dApp system. The integration of SCs with App System is performed every 2-3
development iterations of both systems.
4.2. UML diagrams for SCs
Nowadays, the most popular blockchain for dApp development is Ethereum, and the most used language is So-
lidity. This language is object-oriented (OOPL) because contracts are defined similarly to classes – they have internal
variables, and public and private functions. Each SC can inherit from one or more other contracts. With respect
to a standard OOPL, Solidity adds specific concepts like events and modifiers, and exhibits limitations in the types
available for the SC data structure, and in the management of collections of data – the only collections available so
far are the array and the mapping. In the followings, we will describe an adaptation of UML diagrams specific for
Solidity 0.5. Possible modifications and extensions for other SC languages will be discussed in the section about
future developments.
When designing and documenting SCs, graphic diagrams can be very useful to highlight the connections and the
exchange of messages. To this purpose, we advocate the use of a subset of UML diagrams, being UML the universal
standard for software design diagrams. However, some specific concepts have to be introduced to account for peculiar
SC features. Luckily, UML has an extensibility mechanism called stereotype, which can be used to introduce new
concepts, through tagging.
The UML diagrams we considered and modified to model SCs are Class diagrams, and Sequence diagrams. Also,
UML Statecharts can be used to graphically represent the various states of a SC, or of a App System module and its
transitions. Statecharts, however, do not need any specific stereotype. We already suggested to use also the Use Case
diagrams to model actors and related USs (in place of Use Cases).
The Class diagram enables to represent the structure and relationships of SCs. Table 1 shows the stereotypes we
introduced in UML class diagrams in order to tag the SC specifities, and their description.
In Solidity, there are no classes, but SCs are very similar to classes – a SC has a data structure composed of
variables, and functions able to access these variables. Solidity source code can be used only for creating a SC. This
is accomplished by using a special kind of transaction. The other two kinds of transactions are the transfer of Ethers,
and the invocation of a function on an existing SC (message). A piece of Solidity code can include several SCs, but a
creation transaction can create at most one SC. So, the other SCs can be used to be inherited from the created contract,
or to specify the functions that are called on other existing SCs in the same blockchain, accessed through their address.
These relationships among SCs can be effectively captured by a UML class diagram.
To address the need to manage complex data, Solidity has the "struct" construct, similar to C, C++ and Java. In
UML class diagram, we represent structs as classes, with a proper stereotype and with no bottom operation compart-
ment.
A specific concept of Solidity are events, raised when something relevant happens. They can be caught by observer
programs, able to act correspondingly. Remember that SCs cannot directly invoke functions of external systems. An-
other peculiar concept of Solidity are the modifiers. These are boolean functions called before a function is executed.
They are able to check constraints, and possibly to stop the function execution.
The last four stereotypes of Table 1 are about Solidity collections. Owing to the limitations of blockchain storage,
Solidity allows only two kinds of collections – the array and the mapping. These stereotypes denote the kind of collec-
tion used for multiple variables of a data structure (middle compartment of UML class symbol), or for implementing
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Table 1: Additions to UML class diagram (stereotypes).
Stereotype Position Description
«contract» Class symbol – upper
compartment
Denotes a SC.
«interface» ditto A kind of contract holding only function declarations
«library contract» ditto A contract taken from a standard library
«enum» ditto A list of possible values, assigned to some variable. The
values are listed in the middle compartment. The bottom
compartment (holding operations) must be empty or ab-
sent.
«struct» ditto A record, defined in the data structure of a contract and
used thereof, able to hold heterogeneous data. The fields
are listed in the middle compartment. The bottom com-
partment must be empty or absent.
«event» Class symbol, middle
compartment
An event that can be raised by the SC, signalling some-
thing relevant to external observers.
«modifier» Class symbol, bottom
compartment
A particular kind of guard function, called before another
function
«array» Class symbol, middle
compartment, or role of
an association
A multiple variable, or 1:n relationship which is imple-
mented using an array.
«mapping» ditto The multiple variable, or 1:n relationship is implemented
using a generic mapping.
«mapping [ad-
dress]»
ditto A multiple variable, or 1:n relationship which is imple-
mented using a mapping from an Ethereum address to
the value.
«mapping [uint]» ditto A multiple variable, or 1:n relationship which is imple-
mented using a mapping from a unsigned integer to the
value.
an association, aggregation or composition. The array is an ordered set of values, indexed by their position, as in most
computer languages. In Solidity, new values can be added to it, but not removed. The corresponding stereotype is
"«array»".
The mapping is able to store key-value pairs – the keys being stored as hash values of the actual keys. Given a
key, a mapping can efficiently retrieve the value, but it is unable to iterate on its elements, both keys and values. Given
the importance of the mapping in Solidity, we introduced three stereotypes to represent a mapping, denoted by the
homonymous keyword. The first is the generic mapping; the second is the mapping having an Ethereum address as
key, which is very used. The third refers to a common Solidity pattern – using as keys positive, sequential integers, so
that it is possible to iterate over them.
The other UML diagram very useful to represent the interactions among SCs and external actors is the Sequence
Diagram. These diagrams are used in UML to model messaging. In a blockchain, the relevant messages are related to
the transactions, which in turn are sent from external actors, or from SCs to other SCs. Remember that messages are
synonyms of "calls of public functions".
A specific characteristic of Ethereum is that messages sent to a SC through a transaction take time (typically 15-
20 seconds or more) to be answered. However, if a message is sent to another SC during the execution of a function
of a given SC, the time delay is negligible. This happens because the EVM, during the execution of the calling
function, is able to locate in the blockchain and call any other SC. To explicitly show this difference, which can be
very important for security, GAS consumption and response time, we introduced the stereotypes «trans-msg» and
«direct-msg» tagging the message calls sent through a transaction, and directly by a SC, respectively. Note that the
fact that UML Sequence Diagrams explicitly represent the flow of time from top to bottom of the diagram can also be
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used to quantify the timing difference between the two kinds of messages.
Another peculiarity of Ethereum is that a SC function which does not change the Blockchain is called a "view"
function, and can be called immediately and at no cost. Again, this is because the EVM can locate the SC in the
blockchain, verify that the function is "view" and call it very quickly and using a negligible amount of resources. All
other messages are executed only if proper GAS is paid.
Another kind of message that can be sent is the transfer of Ethers from an address to another. To represent this
transfer, we use the Return Message of UML (a dashed arrow), tagged with the stereotype «ethers».
Our Sequence Diagrams represent the message exchange among external actors and SCs, all called participants,
in a given scenario. The messages among external actors follow the usual UML notation. An external actors, however,
can also send Ethers to another. The messages with at least a SC as sender or receiver belong to the following types:
• Transaction: characterized by coming from an external participant to a SC, it is validated and inserted in a block
by miners.
• Internal function call: a message sent by a SC to another SC that modifies the blockchain, thus costing GAS; it
is represented as the usual "synchronous" or "asynchronous" message of UML Sequence diagrams.
• SC creation: if sent by an external participant it is a transaction, if by another SC it is an internal call; in both
cases it implies the call of the constructor of the new SC. In UML notation, creation is represented drawing the
message arrow directly into the participant box representing the new SC.
• View function call: a message to a SC which does not modify the blockchain, and costs no GAS; it is denoted
by «view» or «pure» stereotype, and can be sent by both kinds of participant.
• Fallback function call: the fallback function is a special function of each SC which is called whenever a function
or an Ether transfer fail. This function implements recovery procedures, but can also be used to call whatever
function of another contract, through the Proxy pattern. For this reason, we deem important to have a specific
«fallback» stereotype.
Note that the above discussed characteristics are specific of Ethereum EVM, irrespectively of the specific high
level language used to code the SCs. Table 2 reports the stereotypes we introduced in UML Sequence diagrams to
identify the participants sending messages (each having a unique address), and the kinds of messages they exchange.
Table 2: The stereotypes added to UML Sequence diagrams.
Stereotype Position Description
«person» Participant
box
A human role who posts transactions bearing messages, through
wallet or some application.
«system» ditto An external software system, able to send transactions to the
Blockchain.
«device» ditto An IoT device, able to send transactions to the Blockchain.
«contract» ditto A SC belonging to the system.
«external contract» ditto A SC external to the system.
«oracle» ditto A particular type of SC, which holds information coming from the
external world, provided by a trusted provider.
«account» ditto An Ethereum address, just holding Ethers. It can only receive or
send Ethers, when its owner activates the transfer.
«trans-msg» Message The message is sent using an Ethereum transaction.
«direct-msg» Message The message is sent by a SC, so it is executed immediately.
«view» or «pure» Message The function called is of type "view" or "pure", so it costs no GAS.
«fallback» Message Call to the fallback function. Only called by a SC on itself.
«ethers» Return Mes-
sage
The dashed arrow represents a transfer of Ethers, and is can be
shown also as a stand-alone message.
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4.3. Security assessment for Smart Contracts
Assessing and defining patterns of good programming practice for Smart Contracts for granting security in dApps
is still in its infancy and is an ongoing area of research. Nevertheless, based on the programmers’ experience and
on recent exploited weaknesses –very (in)famous and critical also for the amount of real money involved–, some
major advices for security assessment in Smart Contracts have been identified and discussed among the the Solidity
developers community. In fact, Ethereum and Blockchain ecosystem are highly new and still somewhat experimental;
in addition, SCs are often designed to handle and transfer significant amount of money (in cryptocurrency, but easily
exchangeable to real money). Therefore, it is necessary that they correctly achieve their purposes, but it is also crucial
that their execution is secure against attacks.
The critical issues regarding the safety of a dApp can be divided in three areas:
• Issues related to Blockchain itself : the blockchain itself could be attacked. It is known, for instance, that
blockchains using proof-of-work for block generation are subject, at least theoretically, to the so-called "51%
attack". Those based on proof-of-stake are vulnerable to other types of attack, for example to "fake stake attack".
Using Ethereum technology, the use of the main net lowers the probability of a "51% attack", given the number
and the computing power fielded by the miners. Instead, using Ethereum Classic blockchain, a fork derived
from Ethereum in 2016, the probability is higher because its miners’ computer power is much lower. Using
a permissioned blockchain, for instance Ethereum Parity "proof-of-authority", there is no "51% attack", but
the blockchain security depends on the honesty and reliability of the validating members, and on their control
over their respective IT services. Clearly, this kind of attacks are are more a problem of design choice of the
technology to be used than of proper dApp design, so their prevention go beyond the scope of this paper.
• Issues related to SCs: the most critical part of a dApp are the SCs, whose bytecode is publicly available, and
exposed to all possible exploits. Moreover, developers often lack a full knowledge about implementation and
usage of SCs, due to the the fact that this technology is in its early stage, it is evolving fast and is different
from traditional development. In literature there are several analyses of possible vulnerabilities related to both
Ethereum virtual machine and Solidity language [36] [35] [44]. These are a good starting point for providing a
checklist of patterns to verify the SCs under development.
• Issues related to the App System: The App System is composed of the server and client side of the dApp,
interacting with the SCs on one side, and with human roles and IoT devices and other systems on the other side.
It must be designed and implemented with care, but it is somewhat less critical, provided that all best practices
related to the security of Web applications are used; a special emphasis must be made to safeguard the access
to the private keys of the various actors. We will not cover general Web security practices in this paper.
In the following of this section, we focus on security assurance practices regarding SC design and coding, which
are the most critical and less studied among the issues cited above.
4.3.1. General concepts of dApp security
The first and foremost concept in security management is to have a security mindset. The development team(s),
and the whole organization, must be fully aware of the importance of security and protection from attacks. Since
ABCDE is an agile process, it is based on principles and practices such as: maximize communication, short iterations,
refactoring, continuous testing, simplicity, intention-revaling code, use of simple tools. All these practices are also
good for security, but Agile means incremental development where USs are continuously completed and tested. This
greatly helps productivity, but might be at the expense of security.
A good starting point to focus on security are the Top 10 Proactive Controls of OWASP organization [45]. Those
most relevant for dApp security, ordered by importance, are:
• C1: Define Security Requirements. This looks straightforward, but it is not. You must explicitly define the
security requirements needed for your system. The requirements can be written as USs, or as non-functional
features, and should have acceptance tests in the form of test cases to confirm these requirements have been
implemented.
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• C2: Leverage Security Frameworks and Libraries. Don’t write everything from scratch, but reuse software that
is security-hardened, is coming from trusted sources and is maintained up to date.
• C5: Validate All Inputs. This should be performed for user inputs on server-side, because client-side validation
can be bypassed. Also, let the SC itself perform validation of key data sent to it through messages.
• C6: Implement Digital Identity. In a dApp environment, digital identities are guaranteed by addresses and by
the ownership of the relative private key, so this control is quite straightforward.
• C7: Enforce Access Controls. SC can check access levels of addresses through a mapping, and act accordingly.
• C8: Protect Data Everywhere. In particular, be aware that data stored in a SC are always accessible to read,
independently of their visibility.
• C10: Handle All Errors and Exceptions. It is known that even small mistakes in error handling, or forgetting to
handle errors can lead to catastrophic failures in distributed systems. This is particularly true for SCs.
Specifically related to SC security are the general guidelines reported in [46], section: "General Philosophy",
which complement OWASP ones. Here will just report a short description, and give the names of related security
patterns, reported below this list:
1. Prepare for failure. Be able to respond to errors, also in the context of SCs, which cannot be changed once
deployed. This is related to patterns ’Emergency stop’, ’Rate limit’, ’Balance limit’ and ’Proxy’
2. Rollout carefully. Try your best to catch and fix the bugs before the SC is fully released. Test contracts
thoroughly, and add tests whenever new attack vectors are discovered.
3. Keep SCs simple. Complexity increases the risk of errors, so ensure that SCs and functions are small and
modular, reuse SCs that are proven, prefer clarity to performance.
4. Keep up to date. Keep track of new security developments and upgrade to the latest version of any tool or
library as quickly as possible.
5. Be aware of blockchain properties. While your previous programming experience is also applicable to SC
programming, there are several pitfalls to be aware of.
4.3.2. Security in the design phase
In the design phase, developers must be aware of, and use security patterns, as reported in references [47], [48],
[49], which we refer to. Table 6 shows the main security patterns.
Table 3: Main security patterns
ID Name Description Ref.
CEI Check-effect-
interaction
When performing a function in a SC: first, check all the preconditions,
then apply the effects to the contract’s state, and finally interact with
other contracts. Never alter this sequence.
[47]
ES Emergency stop, also
known as "Circuit
breaker"
Incorporate an emergency stop functionality into the SC that can be
triggered by an authenticated party to disable sensitive functions. This
is very useful in the case of major bug or security issue.
[47]
SB Speed bump Slow down contract sensitive tasks, so when malicious actions occur,
the damage is limited and more time to counteract is available. For
instance, limit the amount of money a user can withdraw per day, or
impose a delay before withdrawals.
[47]
RL Rate limit Regulate how often a task can be executed within a period of time, to
limit the number of messages sent to a SC, and thus its computational
load.
[47]
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MU Mutex A mutex is a mechanism to restrict concurrent access to a resource.
Utilize it to hinder an external call from re-entering its caller function
again.
[47]
BL Balance limit Limit the maximum amount of funds held within a SC. [47]
GC Guard Check Ensure that all requirements on a SC state and on function inputs are
met. Use properly assert(), require() and revert() to check user inputs,
SC state, invariants.
[50]
WF Withdrawal from
Contracts, also
known as "Pull over
Push"
When you need to send Ethers or tokens to an address, don’t send them
directly. Instead, authorize the address’ owner to withdraw the funds,
and let s/he perform the job.
[51],
[50]
AU Authorization Restrict the execution of code according to the caller address. This is
accomplished using mappings of addresses, and is typically checked
using modifiers.
[48]
OR Oracle An oracle is a SC providing data from outside the blockchain, which
are in turn fed to the oracle by a trusted source. Here the security risk
lies in how actually the source can be trusted.
[48]
RN Randomness Not really a pattern, but some guidelines to simulate randomness in a
deterministic environment like that of SCs. It is possible to query an
Oracle, to use values not predictable a priori as the hash of a block not
yet created.
[48]
TC Time constraint A time constraint specifies when an action is permitted, depending on
the time registered in the block holding the transaction. It is used in
Speed bump and Rate limit patterns.
[48]
TE Termination Used when the life of a SC has come to an end. This can be done by
inserting ad-hoc code in the contract, or calling selfdestruct function.
Usually, only the contract owner is authorized to terminate a contract.
[48]
MH Math A logic which computes some critical operations, protecting from over-
flows, underflows or other undesired characteristics of finite arithmetic.
[48]
PD Proxy Delegate Proxy patterns are a set of SCs working together to facilitate upgrading
of SCs, despite their intrinsic immutability. A Proxy is used to refer to
another SC, whose address can be changed. This approach also ensure
that blockchain resources are used sparingly, thus saving GAS.
[49],
[50]
Our approach consists in using two security checklists, one to be performed during and after design and design
upgrades, the other during coding phases. The aim is to verify that all security patterns and practices concerning
known problems are applied. These practices are complementary to the agile practices reported in sections 2.2 and
4.1. Depending on the size of the project and the number of SCs, the checklist can be unique for the system, or you
may use a separate checklist for each SC subsystem.
Tables 4 and 5 present the security assurance practices we propose. they describe the checks to be performed,
a short description of the vulnerability/vulnerabilities and how to avoid it/them, and one or more references to learn
more about the problem. From these tables, it is easy to extract two checklists to be used to perform security assurance
during the design and the coding of the SC system, respectively.
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Table 4: Security assurance checklist for the design phase
To Check Description Ref. Related pat-
terns
Re-entrancy Functions that could be called recursively, before the first invo-
cations is finished. This may cause destructive consequences.
Ensure state committed before an external call.
[8] [46] CEI, MU
Dependencies Use audited and trustworthy dependencies to existing SCs and
ensure that newly written code is minimized by using libraries.
[46]
Multiple Inheritance
Caution
Solidity uses the "C3 linearization". This means that when a
contract is deployed, the compiler will linearize the inheritance
from right to left. Multiple overrides of a function in complex
inheritance hierarchies could potentially interact in tricky ways.
[46]
Include a fail-safe
mechanism
It is important to have some way to update the contract in the
case some bugs will be discovered. For example, it is possible to
have a contract forwarding calls and data to the latest version of
the contract.
ES, SB, RL,
PD
Limit the amount of
ether
If the code, the compiler or the platform has a bug, the funds
stored in your smart contract may be lost, so limit the maximum
amount. Check that all money transfers are performed through
explicit withdrawals made by the beneficiary.
RL, BL, WF
Be careful with ran-
domness
Random number generation in a deterministic system is very
difficult. Do not rely on pseudo-randomness for important
mechanisms. Current best solutions include hash-commit-reveal
schemes (ie. one party generates a number, publishes its hash
to "commit" to the value, and then reveals the value later) and
RANDAO.
[36]
section
III-A-7
Be careful with
Timestamp
Be aware that the timestamp of a block can be manipulated by
a miner; all direct and indirect uses of timestamp should be an-
alyzed and verified. If the scale of your time-dependent event
can vary by 30 seconds and maintain integrity, it is safe to use
a timestamp. This include thing like ending of auctions, regis-
tration periods, etc. Do not use the block.number property as a
timestamp.
[35]
section
IV-C
TC
Never assume that
a contract has zero
balance
Be aware of coding an invariant that strictly checks the balance
of a contract. An attacker can forcibly send ether to any account
and this cannot be prevented.
[46]
Transaction Order-
ing
Miners have the power to alter the order of transactions arriving
in short times. Inconsistent transactions’ orders, with respect to
the time of invocations, can cause race conditions.
[35]
section
IV-B
TC
4.3.3. Security in the coding phase
During coding, one major class of problems derives from “external calls”, namely from functions which recur to
others’ SC code for completing their execution. In fact, a SC can call another SC, exploiting the execution of code
contained in the latter contract. The pattern can be recursive, so the called SC can in turn perform an external call,
and so on. As a consequence, external calls must be treated like calls to ‘untrusted’ software. They should be avoided
or minimized, because some malicious code could be introduced somewhere in a SC belonging to this path, and any
external call represents a security risk. A typical risk of such contract interaction is “reentrancy”, namely the called
contract can call back the calling function before the overall function execution has been completed. This pattern has
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been performed in the DAO attack. When it is not possible to avoid external calls, label all the potentially unsafe
variables, functions and contracts interfaces as untrusted. Also, follow the "Check-effect-interaction" pattern.
Another important tool for SC security and error handling is the use of assert(), require() and revert() guard
functions. They are a very powerful security tool, and are the subject of security pattern "Guard Check" presented
in Table 6. In general, use assert() to check for invariants, to validate state after making changes, to prevent wrong
conditions; if an assert() statement fails, something very wrong happened and you need to fix the code. Use require()
when you want to validate: user inputs, state conditions preceding an execution, or the response of an external call.
Use revert() to handle the same type of cases as require(), but with more complex logic [46].
The most important tool to achieve security and correctness, however, is to apply thorough, automated tests. This
is even more crucial when writing SCs, because it is difficult or impossible to update a SC. ABCDE does not prescribe
the use ofspecific testing practices, such as Test Driven Design, but highlights the importance of testing. Presently, the
most popular testing framework for Ethereum dApps is Truffle, whose website also provides documentation on how
to test SCs and App System code – see [24], section: Testing Your Contracts.
The checklist for security assessment in the coding phase is reported in Table 5.
Table 5: Security assurance checklist for the coding phase
To Check Description Ref. Related pat-
terns
External calls If possible, avoid them. When using low-level call functions
(address.call(), callcode(), delegatecall() and send()) make sure
to handle the possibility that the call will fail, by checking the
return value. Also, avoid combining multiple ether transfers in
a single transaction. Mark untrusted interactions: name the vari-
ables, methods, and contract interfaces of the functions that call
external contracts, in a way that makes it clear that interacting
with them is potentially unsafe.
[46] CEI, MU,
GC, WF
Prevent overflow and
underflow
If a balance reaches the maximum uint value it will circle back to
zero; similarly, if a uint is made to be less than zero, it will cause
an underflow and get set to its maximum value. One simply
solution is to use a library like SafeMath.sol by OpenZeppelin.
[35]
section
III-C
MH, GC
Beware of rounding
errors
All integer divisions round down to the nearest integer. Check
that truncation does not produce unexpected behaviour (locked
funds, incorrect results).
[46] MH, GC
Validate inputs to
external and public
functions
Make sure the requirements are verified and check for argu-
ments.
[35]
section
IV-F
GC
Prevent unbounded
loops
The gas consumed increases with each iteration until it hits the
block’s gasLimit, stopping the execution.
[50]
tx.origin It is a global variable that returns the address of the message
sender. Do not use tx.origin as an authorization mechanism.
[52]
section
3.1
Fallback functions Fallback functions are called when a contract receive a message
without arguments and when no other function matches. You
should keep them simple and check that the data is empty to
avoid malicious invocation.
[46] [35]
section
IV-A
CEI, MU, GC
Check if built-in vari-
ables or functions
were overridden
It is currently possible to override built-in globals in Solidity,
such as . This allows SCs to override the functionality of built-
ins such as msg and revert(). Although this is intended, it can
mislead users of a SC, so the whole SC code must be checked.
[46] GC
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Use interface type in-
stead of the address
for type safety
When a function takes a contract address as an argument, it is
better to pass an interface or contract type rather than raw ad-
dress. If the function is called elsewhere within the source code,
the compiler it will provide additional type safety guarantees.
[46] GC
Enforce invariants
with assert()
An assert guard triggers when an assertion fails - for instance an
invariant property changing. You can verify it with a call to as-
sert(). Assert guards should be combined with other techniques,
such as pausing the contract and allowing upgrades. (Otherwise,
you may end up stuck, with an assertion that is always failing.)
[46] GC
Lock pragmas to spe-
cific compiler version
Contracts should be deployed with the same compiler version
and flags that they have been tested with, so locking the version
helps avoid the risk of undiscovered bugs.
[46]
Fix compiler warn-
ings
Take warnings seriously and fix them. Always use the latest ver-
sion of the compiler to be notified about all recently introduced
warnings.
[51]
Testing Be sure to have a 100% text coverage and cover all critical edge
cases with unit tests. Do not deploy recently written code, espe-
cially if it was written under tight deadline.
4.4. Gas optimization
Besides security, another important factor of SCs that must be carefully designed since the beginning is their cost.
Creating SCs and writing permanent data in a public blockchain can be very costly, so it is important to keep them
to a minimum, and to limit the transactions that write or modify these data. Also, the messages exchanged among
the App System and the SCs, and among SCs, must be properly designed and well documented. Table 6 shows some
specific patterns that can be used to save GAS.
Note that in Ethereum the maximum size of the bytecode of a SC is restricted to 24 KBytes by the standard EIP
170 (see section 13.4.2 of [27]). For serious SCs, that size limit can be hit easily, so many of the GAS saving patterns
are useful also to make a SC viable.
Table 6: Main GAS saving patterns
ID Name Description Ref.
PD Proxy Delegate When you need to call external SCs, do not include their code.
Include their interface and use the Proxy pattern, which uses the
fallback function to call the SC functions. This is the same pat-
tern also shown in Table 6
[49]
LS Limit Storage Limit data stored in the blockchain. Store non-permanent data
in memory. Avoid changing storage data during computations –
change them only after all the calculations.
[53]
PK Pack your variables In Ethereum, you pay GAS for every storage slot of 256 bits
you use. You can pack as many variables as you want in it, but
you must order their declaration properly. Use integers smaller
than 256 bits only if you have many to pack. If not, using 256
bits integers avoids the needed conversion to 256 bits, which
costs GAS. Remember that elements in memory and call data
are not packed. Use datatype bytes32 rather than bytes or string,
if possible. Limit constant strings, for instance those used in
require() to explicit the error, to fit in 32 bytes.
[53]
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DV Delete variables no
more needed
If you donâA˘Z´t need a variable anymore, delete it using the
delete keyword. In Ethereum, you get a GAS refund for free-
ing up storage space.
[53]
NI Do not initialize vari-
ables with default
values
All variables are initialized to zeroes at no cost. Do not explicitly
initialize them to zero, or a value is given to them anyway when
they are used.
[53]
MP Use Mappings To manage lists of data, use mappings with integer key and not
arrays. This is known to save blockchain space.
[53]
EP Execution Paths Thoroughly examine all possible execution paths, looking for
code whose execution can be spared. Avoid repetitive checks of
variables. Logical operators ’||’ and ’&&’ evaluate only the first
operand if the second is not needed, so order them to maximize
the probability that only one operand is computed.
[53]
LE Limit external calls Limit calls to other SCs. Note that calling external functions is
cheaper than calling public functions. The cheapest calls, how-
ever, are those to internal functions.
[53]
LM Limit modifiers . The code of modifiers is "inlined" inside the modified function,
thus costing GAS. Internal functions, on the other hand, are not
inlined but called as separate functions. They are very slightly
more expensive in run time but save a lot of redundant bytecode
in deployment, if used more than once.
[53]
UL Use libraries . The bytecode of external libraries is not made part of your
SC, thus saving GAS. However, calling them is costly and has
security issues. Use libraries for complex tasks.
[53]
EL Event Log If the App System needs to retrieve information about past
events, that is not useful for SC execution, let the app directly
access the Event Log in the blockchain. Note that if the event
happened far in time, the time to retrieve it may be long.
[53]
5. Experimental Validation
The development process which later was named ABCDE was first devised in 2018 [54], and since then it has been
used in several project carried on in our University group, and in firms we are consulting. Among the projects which
were developed, or which are in development, we may quote a system to trace the provenance of foods, a supply chain
management system, a system to manage temporary job contracts, a voting system which was used to reward the best
presentation at a conference, another one managing voting in firm shareholders’ and board of directors meetings, a
system to manage energy exchange in local networks of electricity producers and consumers, a system to automate
agile software development [34].
The feedback of dApp developers using ABCDE method was generally positive, and was used to improve the
method – especially concerning security and GAS optimization practices.
Here we present, as an example of ABCDE usage, a simplified version of a dApp application aiming to implement
a decentralized exchange (DEX) for tokens managed on Ethereum blockchain. A DEX is a system enabling the
exchange of different tokens between two holders, who interact directly, without intermediaries. We started from the
well-known 0x protocol project, the subject of a successful ICO held in 2017. The specification of the DEX can be
found in the 0x Whitepaper [55]. We present a simplified version of the whole system. In particular, we dropped the
part related to the protocol token (Section 4 of the Whitepaper). Moreover, for the sake of brevity, we will not present
the coding phases (phases 6, 8 and 9), but we stop at the end the design phases (phases 5 and 7). The steps of ABCDE
are presented below.
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1. Goal of the system. To manage a decentralized exchange, able to enable pairs of ERC20 and ERC721 token
holders to exchange their tokens at an agreed rate on the Ethereum blockchain.
2. Actors. The system has the following actors:
• Trader: owner of tokens, wishing to post an offer, or to accept a posted offer.
• Maker: a trader who posts an offer to sell a given amount of her/his tokens, in exchange to tokens of
another type, at a given exchange rate.
• Taker: a trader who accepts the offer of a Maker.
• Relayer: a system which facilitates signaling between market participants by hosting and propagating an
order book of the offers.
• DEX: smart contract(s) on the Ethereum blockchain which accept orders signed by both a Maker and
Taker, and activate the exchange of tokens.
• Token: a SC on the Ethereum blockchain, managing a given token according to the ERC20 or ERC721
protocols.
Figure 4: The User Stories of the DEX system specification.
3. User Stories. Fig. 4 shows the actors and the USs they are involved in, using a UML Use Case diagram,
where the use cases are in fact USs. Note that these USs just specify the DEX, and do not depend on the
specific technology used to implement it, except for the Ethereum blockchain, which the DEX necessarily has
to interact with. Here we have no room to show the USs in detail, so we refer the readers to the above quoted
Whitepaper [55]. Instead, in Fig. 5 we show the UML class diagram derived by an analysis of the given USs.
This diagram is not bound to a specific implementation of the relayer system, but just shows schematically the
entities, the data structures and the operations emerging from the USs of Fig. 4.
4. Divide the system into SC and App subsystems. In this case the subdivision is trivial, because the Relayer
system is a typical Web application, whereas the DEX and the Tokens are Smart Contracts by design. The
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Figure 5: The standard UML class diagram derived from the USs.
USs of the external app subsystem are the same of those reported in Fig. 4, except the last one ("execute
the order"), which is carried on solely by SCs. As regards the blockchain subsystem, the US to implement
are basically the messages to submit an order, or to cancel an order, sent by a Taker to the DEX. In practice,
the actual implementation of the DEX contracts made by 0X Team is very complex, due to the strict security
requirements, and to the many checks that must be made before performing the actual token transfer.
5. Design of the SC subsystem. The SC system is very complex, and a detailed description of its architecture is
well beyond the scope of this paper. We report in Fig. 6 just a simplified UML class diagrams showing some
of the actual SCs, to show some of the specific stereotypes used to document an SC system, as described in
section 4.2. The modifiers and the events enforcing the constraints relevant for the DEX are shown in Table 7
and Table 8, respectively.
Fig. 7 shows a UML sequence diagram representing the interactions among most Actors of the systems, when a
Taker accepts an order seen in the Relayer’s book, and sends it to the DEX for execution, including the messages
exchanged among the SCs.
6. Omitted.
7. Design of App System. The App System is composed of the software able to present the present offers of
tokens posted by the takers, and of the software used by takers and makers, respectively to post, modify or
delete offers, and to accept offers. The latter software must be provided of a wallet able to store Ethers and
send transactions to Ethereum blockchain. The design of this subsystem includes that of its user interfaces. The
system is fairly complex, and the wallets must be designed and implemented using strong security practices.
We will not dig further into this subsystem because, except for the wallet, it is a standard, Web-based system.
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Figure 6: The modified UML diagram, showing the structure of the required SCs of the DEX system.
8. Omitted.
9. Omitted.
6. Conclusion and Future Work
Despite the huge effort presently ongoing in developing dApps, software engineering practices are still poorly
applied in software development of blockchain systems. The field is in fact still in its infancy, and tools or techniques
for modeling and managing the peculiarities a software developer must face when dealing with blockchain-oriented
software systems are still matter for researchers. Tools and techniques of traditional software engineering have not
yet been adapted and modified to adhere to this new software paradigm. A sound software engineering approach
might greatly help in overcoming many of the issues plaguing blockchain development providing developers with
instruments similar to those typically used in traditional software engineering to afford architectural design, security
issues, testing planes and strategies and to improve software quality and maintenance.
Researchers in software engineering have a big opportunity to start studying a field that is very important and
brand-new exploiting concepts, tools, instruments and ideas already consolidated in software engineering and chang-
ing and adapting them to this new software technology.
This work, whose a first version was presented in [54], moves toward this direction providing a full modeling of
interactions among traditional software and blockchain environment, including Class diagrams, Statecharts, USâA˘Z´s
diagrams, Sequence diagrams, Smart Contracts diagrams – all specialized for blockchain application development.
It also provides a general scheme for managing blockchain development processes, and a simplified example of a
Distributed Exchange Smart Contract, taken from a real set of SCs implementing a DEX.
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Table 7: The modifiers of the SCs.
Modifier Action – Notes
onlyOwner() Enforces that the sender of the message is the owner of the contract.
Inherited by Ownable standard contract
nonReentrant() Enforces that the message is not recursively sent
onlyAuthorized() Enforces that the sender of the message belongs to a list of authorized
addresses managed by the same SC
Table 8: The events of the SCs.
Event Action – Notes
Fill An order has been filled in the DEX.
Cancel An order has been cancelled in the DEX.
CancelUpTo An order has been partially cancelled from the DEX.
AuthorizedAddressAdded An address has been added to the list of authorized ones.
AuthorizedAddressRemoved An address has been removed from the list of authorized ones.
We believe that our work can be really valuable to blockchain firms, including ICO startups, that could develop a
competitive advantage using SE (BOSE) practices since the beginning. The proposed method has also the potential to
be applied to other SC environments, such as Hyperledger, Ripple and others, and we are exploring these extensions.
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